Philosophical behaviourism : a critical analisis by Melisa Abby, David Jemut
Faculty of Cognitive Sciences and Human Development 
PmLOSOPIDCAL BEHAVIOURISM: A CRITICALANALISIS 
• 
Melisa Abby Dayjd Jemut 
BF 
Bachelor of Science with Honours455 
M523 (Cognitive Science) 
2004 2004 
Pusal Khidrnal MakluffiIIl Akademlk 
l1NIVERSm MALAYSIA SARAWAK 
94 \t,11 " "'" S ImaraiJJIl 
PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIOURISM: A CRITICAL ANALISIS 




Melisa Abby David Jemut 

This project is submitted in partial fulfillm ent of 





Faculty of Cognitive Sciences and Human Development 





The project entitled Philosophical Behaviourism: A Critical Analysis was prepared by 
Mel isa Abby David Jem ut and submitted to the Faculty of Cognitive Sciences and 
Human Developmen t in partial fulfillment of the requi reme nts of Bachelor of Science 
(Ho nours) in Cognitive Scie nce. 





Firs t of all , I thank God because He gave me wisdom and s tre ng th in completi o n 
of my s tud y. Much appreciation to my respected s upe rv iso r, Dr. Tan Kok Wah for his 
guidance and support throughout this study. Your sac rifice, underst anding an d total care 
are unrepayab le. May God continua lly bless you l To my deares t family, papa, mama, 
brothers Dan, Ben, Dion, Odo, Adik and Ivy, yo u are a ll always m y inspiration. Thanks 
for the support and praye r in every aspect. Deepest gratitude to my friends , Alice, Diana , 
Doreen, Est her, Helena , Lydia and Maureen for their support and prayers in the 
comple tion of this study. I thank God for the love and care that we have shared. Not 
fo rgetting brother Yakup fo r bei ng the kindest and he lpful person in times o f needs. His 
helps are deeply appreCiat ed. Also to all members of UCF, Kak Ayeng, Alex, Bert and 
brother Sly for their prayers and support. Lastly , to all st affs of th e Facult y of Cognitive 
Science and Human Deve lopment, and the helpful people of UNlMAS , I truly appreciate 









Table Of Contents IV 





I. INTRODU CTION 
1.1 T he Beginning 	 1 





1.1.2 	 Varieties of Behavio urism 5 

1.1.3 	 The World of Ph il osophical Behaviouri sm 7 

1.2 Lite rature Re view 	 10 

1.3 Problem Statement 13 

14 Objectives of the Research 14 

1.5 Resea rch Scope and Limitation 	 14 

1.6 C hapters Organiza tio n 	 15 

1.7 Conclus io n 	 15 

ARGU MENTS FOR PHILOSOPHICAL BEllAVIO ruSM 
2.1 	 Introd uc ti o n 17 

2.2 	 Refutation of the Exis tence of Nonphysical Mind 17 

IV 
2.3 The Argument That the Mental-State Thing-Words Do 19 

No t Really Indi ca te Things At All 

2.4 	 Statement About A Person's Mental States Could Actuall y Be 20 

Translated into Some Set of Statements about the Perso n's 

Beha viour and Behav ioural Propensit ies 

2 .5 	 Conclusion 22 

3. 	 CRJTICISMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIOURJSM 
3. 1 	 Intwduction 23 

3.2 	 More Arguments Aga inst Philosophi ca l Behaviourism 

3 21 Pretending 25 

3. 2.2 	 Qualia 27 

3.2.3 	 Learning My Ow n Belief 29 

3.2.4 	 Beliefs Can Cause Behaviour 31 

3.2.5 	 Package Dea l Arg uments 32 





3 .2 .7 	 Problems with Mental Causation 36 

3. 2.8 	 Pain of the Paralysed 37 

3.2.9 	 Inability to Eliminate Mental E ntities 38 

3.3 	 Conclus ion 39 

·t 	 SUMMARY AND S UGGESTIONS 
4.1 	 Introduction 40 

4.2 	 Summary of Research 40 

v 






PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIOURISM A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
Melisa Abby David ]emut 
This study aims to examine critically the centra l thes is o f philosophical 
behaviourism. The objecti ves o f thi s s tud y are to explain what is behaviourism and more 
specificall y p hil osophical be hav iourism. Mainl y, this stud y explores the argumen ts for 
and against phil osophical behavio uri sm. This study has generall y accomplished the 
objectives set o ut. The majo r finding is that philosophical behaviouri s m is largely 
discredited due to its weaknesses. Some of it s major tenets tha t claim, for in s tance, that 
mind is behaviour and the total denial of inner mental s tates are unacceptable. It is hoped 
that the thesis ha s contributed so mething useful to th e literature. 
Vll 
ABSTRAK 
FALSAFAH TFNGKAHLAKU' ANALfSfS SECARA KRlTIKAL 
Melisa Abby David Jemut 
Kajian. ini bertujuan un/uk mengkaji seeara krilikal isu-isu as as falsafah 
tingkahlaku. Objek/if kajian ini adalah un/uk menjelaskan maksud tingkahlaku dan 
seeara khususnya falsafah tingkahlaku. Khususnya, kajian ini dijalankan unluk 
menerokai perbineangan alau fa1<1a yang menyokong dan membanlah falsafah 
tingkahlaku. Kajian ini seeQJ'a amnya Ielah meneapai objeklifyang telah disenaraikan. 
Dapalan kajian mendapali bahawa falsafah lingkahlaku telah dilolak oleh ahii-ahli 
falsafah kerana terdapal banyak kelemahan. Seselengah pandangan ulamanya yang 
menyatakan bahawa minda adalah lingkah laku dan juga pengabaiannya terhadap 
menIal dalaman adalah lidak di/erima. Diharapkan bahawa kajian ini leiah 






1.1 The Beginning 
Graham (2002: 1) po inted out that behaviourism identifies mind w ith 
behaviour because " behave is what organisms do". Behaviourism is built on lhis 
assumption, and its goa l is to promote the scienti fic study of behaviour. Behaviourism 
is actually a doctrine, or se t of doctrines, abou t human and nonhuman anima l 
be haviour. In this c hap ter, we would trace back the orig in of the idea. 
A stud y by Gardne r ( l985: 10-16) points out that early behav iouri sts brought 
up two very significant propositions. The first one says that every researcher 
engrossed in a scien ce of behaviour should restrict themselves to public methods of 
observations, w hereby any sc ientist could relate and measure. There should not also 
be any internal or private introspections: every e lement of scie nce o ug ht to be 
obse rvable and explained phys ically . 
Secondly, those interes ted in a science of behav iour sbould be emphas izing 
completely on the "behav iou r" itself: diligen tl y avo iding the internal processes of the 
mind such as cognition , or imagination and concep tual framework suc h of inte ntions, 
des ires or plans. Furtherm ore, they are al so not allowed to e nte rtain hypot het ical 
mental constructs like symbols, ideas, schemas, or any othe r possible forms of men tal 
representation. 
In 1912, John B. Watwn proposed a manifesto to discard the in trospec ti oni st 
attempts that make consciousness a subject of ex perime ntal iuvestigation but focus 
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instead on behavio ural manifestations of intellige nce . Shortly afterwards, B.F. 
Skinner toughen up behav iourist strictures to exclude inner physiologica l processes 
along with inward experiences as items of legitimate psychologica l matter (Ha user, 
2002: 1). 
Behav iouri sm took a dec ided ly philosophica l tu rn fo ll owing 
the most philosophica ll y important type of behaviourism, oft en called logica l or 
philosophical behaviourism, which is associated with G il bert Ryle (Clark, 2001: 165). 
Ryle (1999 : 31 7) argues th at, with the excep tion of pain, all of our mental states can be 
analyzed th rough our behaviour, and he de nies that ou r men tal sta tes refl ect anything 
more than a predictable way of acting. 
It is indeed a movement in psychology and philosophy, w hic h ex hi bit a 
highlight on the outward behavioural aspects of thought, and conceals the inward 
experiential and maybe sometimes the inner proced ural aspects. However, in thi s 
thesis, [ wo uld like to foc us on the philosophical aspect of behav iourism. 
1.1.1 Bypass ing Cartesian Dualism - The Reactions Against Dualism 
From a philosoph ical perspective, behaviourism bypassed Car tesian 
Duali sm - Descartes' theory that the mi nd and body are two separate 
"substances" tha t are contingently related. The demise of dualism is one of the 
main reasons for the emergence of behaviourism. We wou ld hence examine 
this f irs t befo re d iscussing behaviourism in more de ta il la te r. 
Dualism talks aboul the mind as a non-physical entit y (Wa rburton, 
1999: 13 1). Rene Descartes claims that each time we introspect, or refl ect on 
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our own thinking, having feeling , em oti ons and beliefs, it is imposs ibl e to 
di scove r any ph ysical property. This means that emotions are esse nti al and 
important as it detennines the personalit y of a person somehow, it could not 
simpl y be evaluated as having characte r suc h as colo ur, size or even shape 
(Clark, 2001: 162) . 
The Ca rt es ian conception claims th at the mental is essentially private 
and subjective and it also declares that ment al states are essentially conscious 
experi ences: onl y the one to whom a me ntal phenomenon occurred wo uld be 
able to kn ow what he or she is experiencing. 
Gilbert Ryle, a philosophical be hav iouri st claims that Descartes is 
wrong to think that our outward actions or behaviour is evidence for an inner 
state that causes our behaviour (Ego, 2001: 1). Consider Ryle's exampl e of 
attentive listening. Dualism would put thi s into two acts. Firstly, the phys ical 
process of rece iving sound, and secondly, the me ntal process of "atte nding" 
which ca uses o ur li ste ning to be attenti ve (Ryle, 1999: 317). 
Nevertheless, according to Ryle, in describing a pe rson's mind we are 
describing th e wa ys in which paris of hi s or her conduct are managed. 
Listening should not be characterised as a physical action, while being 
attentive as a mental action, he argues that there is merely one process 
characterised as "attenti ve li stening" (Ryle, 1999: 317). 
Ryle says that by us ing psychologica l predi ca tes as reference to a 
private me ntal item, we are making a ca tegory mistake . R y!e's example of a 
category mistake is an analogy of a unive rsity. A visitor would see all the 
things that make up the university - the library , the halls of residence, the 
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students and the lec turers - but the visitor wou ld be mistaken in thinking there 
was some separate "object" which was called " university" (Ry le, 1999: 319­
320). Dualism looks for a mental object th a t can pick ou t so mething named 
a ttentive but Ryle disagrees. Consider for example the capturing of the 
phenomena of a melting ice cube. Melting is no t actua lly some hidden "object" 
which is a separate thing to the ice cube; the ice cube is predisposed to melt at 
any temperature above O°C. Melting is si mpl y the behaviour of th e ice cube, 
no t a se parate part of it, as "attentive" is m erely the behaviour o f the subject. 
This illustration is another analogy to illuminate Ryle ' s conception of the 
ca tego ry mista ke. 
Other fonns of Dualism include epiphe nome nali sm , parallelism, and 
property dualism. The epiphenomenalist holds that the body affects the mind, 
bu t not vice-versa. The mind only appea rs to affect. th e body, because the 
apparen t mental causes of bodily changes (like the decision to lift my arm) 
co incide with the true bodily causes (some change in my brain). Parallelists 
hold that mind and body are two substances tha t do not interact a t all. This is 
usually indicat.ed through our ordinary experie nces. Heil (1998: 27) stated that 
mental s ta tes seem to affect the body in cert ain ways, and through it, affecting 
the materi al world beyond our body. However, it appea rs impl ausible that 
"events and objects in the world" e ncompass an influe nce on the mind in the 
same way it affects the body . Simply sa id , parall e lis ts believe that the mind 
and body occur parallel to each other but th ey do not influence each o ther. 
On the other hand , property duali sm maintains that the mind can he 
identified with the brain (or with the body as a w hole), but mental properties 
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cannot be reduced to physical ones. On thi s view, it is my brain which is 
respo nsible for sensation, perception and other me ntal phenome na. But the 
fact that my brain is thinking a certain tho ught, for exa mple, is an additional 
fact about it , one that cannot be reduced to an y of its physical properties (Perry 
and Bratman, 1999: 806). 
It is claimed that Dualism as a philosophical theory of mind is 
ultimately uninformative (Clark, 2001: 162). Often, it tells us of what the mind 
could not poss ibly be such that the mind is not a body , nor a brain or anything 
else that is phys ically observable by the bare eyes. But, it never addresses the 
ques tion of what the mind possibly is . 
1.1.2 Varieties of Behaviourism 
Be haviourism is committed in its fullest and mos t complete sense to the 
truth of the fo llowing three set of claims (Graham, 2002 : 1-2): 
(1) Psychology is the science of behaviour . Psychology is not the 
science of mind. 
(2) Behaviour can be described and explained without making reference 
to mental events or to internal psychological processes . The sources of 
behaviour are external (in the environment), not internal (in the mind). 
(3) In the course of theory de velopment in psychology, if, somehow, 
mental te rms or concepts are deployed in describing or explaining 
be hav iour, then either (a) these terms or concepts should be eliminated 
and replaced by behavioural te rms or (b) they can and s hould be 
translated or paraphrased into be havioural concepts . 
These three se t of claims are logica ll y di stinc t. Moreover, taken 
in dependentl y, each helps to form a type of behavi ouri sm. " Methodological " 
behaviourism is committed to the truth of (1). "Psychological" behaviourism 
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is committed to the truth of (2). "Philosophical" behaviourism (also known as 
"Analytical" or "Logical" behaviourism) is committed to the truth of the 
statement in (3) that mental terms or concepts can and should be translated into 
behavioural concepts. 
Methodological behaviourism is a normative theory about the scientific 
conduct of psychology. It claims that psychology should concern itself with 
the behaviour of organisms (human and nonhuman animals). Psychology 
should not concern itself with mental states or events or with constructing 
internal information processing accounts of behaviour. According to 
methodological behaviourism, reference to mental events (such as an animal's 
beliefs or desires) adds nothing to what psychology can and should understand 
about the sources of behaviour. Mental events are private entities which, given 
the necessary publicity of science, do not form proper objects of empirical 
study. Methodological behaviourism is a dominant theme in the writings of 
John Watson (Prinz, n.d.: 1). 
As stated by Graham (2002: 2), psychological behaviourism is a 
research program within psychology. It purports to explain human and animal 
behaviour in terms of external physical stimuli, responses, learning histories, 
and (for certain types of behaviour) reinforcements. Psychological 
behaviourism is present in the work of Ivan Pavlov, Edward Thorndike, as well 
as Watson (Hauser, 2002: 3). Its fullest and most influential expresslOn IS 
Skinner's work on schedules of reinforcement (Graham, 2002: 2). 
As an illustration of psychological behaviourism, consider Watson's 
work which was based on the experiments of Ivan Pavlov, who had studied 
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animals ' responses to conditio ning. In Pavlov's best-known ex periment, he 
rang a be ll as he fed some dngs several mea ls. Each time the dogs heard the 
be ll they knew tha t a meal was coming, and they would begin to sali va te. 
Pavlov the n rang the bell w ithout bring ing food, but the dogs s till sa liva ted . 
T hey had been "conditioned" to salivate a t the so und of a bell . Pavlov 
believed, as Watson was later to emphas ize, that humans react to s timuli in the 
same way (DeMar, n.d.: 1). 
On the other hand , philosophica l behaviourism is a theory within 
philosophy abou t the meaning or semantics of mental terms or concep ts. It 
s tates that the ve ry notion of a mental state or cond ition is the no tion of a 
behavioural di sposition or family of behavioural tendencies. When we 
a ttribute a belief to someone, for example, we are not saying th at he o r she is in 
a particular internal state or condition. Instead, we are characte riz ing the perso n 
in terms of what he or she might do in particular situations (Graham , 2002: 2) . 
Philosophical behaviourism is found in the work of Gilbert Ryle in The 
Concept of Mind (1949) and the later work of Ludwig Wittgens tein in The 
Philosophical In vestigation (Hauser, 2002: 7). 
1.1.3 The World of Philosophical Behaviourism 
Be havio urism means different things to philosophers and psychologis ts. 
In philosophy, philosophical be havio uri sm is us ua ll y formulated as the 
doc trine tha t s tate ments about the mental have the same meaning as (are 
anal yti cally eq ui va lent to) s ta tements about behaviou r. T hose who contrast 
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private, introspeClible mental phenomena such as pams and publicly 
observable behaviour are mistaken. For, to give a crude example, the 
behaviourist holds that the statement "she is in pain" means the same as (is 
analytically equi valent to) the statement "she is manifes ting ave rsio n 
behaviour" (Kim, 1996: 38). 
As me ntioned earlier, Gilbert Ryle is the precursor of philosophical 
behaviourism, he wa nted to show that Desca rtes had created a myth which 
divided the world up into mental and physical substances. Some behaviourists 
have accepted the idea that there simply are no phenomena of mind , that the 
mind is a kind of fiction superimposed on the complex movements of human 
bodies - which simply implies that the mind is a non-existent substance 
altoge ther (Warburton, 1999: 140-141). Such extreme eliminat ivist 
behaviourism was certainly never part of Ryle's project. However, there is a 
kind of behaviourism which treats the mind not as fiction but as definable in 
terms of behaviour. The real question is how far Ryle can be understood as 
advocating this sort of view. 
Demjan~uk (2000: 6) states that Ryle regarded the very question of 
whether the world is ultimately physical as conceptually confused. He spoke 
of age ntial be hav ioural dispositions, and showed I ittl e inclinatio n to analyse 
this away in terms of physical behavioural di spositions. Ryle (1999: 319) was 
Chiefly concerned to deflate the idea that there must be complex inner mental 
processes behind a person's public actions and to show how this dissolved the 
problem of other minds . RyJe (1999: 319) speaks about "category mistakes", 
which consists in taking one kind of thing for another as when the confused 
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tourist says that he has seen all the college buildings in Oxfo rd , but has yet to 
find the Uni versity. What the touris t has failed to buitdings. 
Applied to the mind , the idea seems to be this : it is easy to be mis led 
into thinking it is a special kind of thing, differe nt from, but belo nging to, the 
same general ca tegory as the ma tter that makes up the phys ica l world . 
Oemjan<;;uk (2000: 6) al so reinforces Ryle ' s belief that " the hallowed contrast 
between mind and matter will be dissipated, but dissipa ted .not by either of 
th e equally hallowed absorptions of mind by matter or of matter by mind". 
DemjaJ1(;uk (2000: 6) also agrees with the sugges ti on from Ryle that 
when one tries to find the difference between intelligence and lack of it , one 
should not look for some special mind stuff, the operation of which makes 
someone intelligent. One should be asking by what cr iterion intelligen t 
behaviour is actually distinguished from non-intelligent be hav iour. In thi s and 
in numerous o ther examples, Ryle (Demjan<;uk , 2000: 6) suggests th at the 
mind cons ists in patterns of behaviour and that to think otherwise about it is 
precisely to ca tegorise it wrongly . In Ryle's examples, behav iour is always 
trea ted as full y inte ntional , there is no attempt to c haracteri se it in non-mental, 
physica l terms . In spite of the difficulties of interpreta ti on, Ryl e 's concept ion of 
mind contains specifi c, important insights into mental processes. Some of the 
things Ryle says might even encourage one to think his pos ition is an earl y 
form of functionalism. 
Philoso phers have two main objections to behaviourism. First, 
behaviourists hold that statements about the mental mean the same as 
statements abo ut behaviour, but it seems understandable that mental 
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phenome nd Cd use behdviour. Pain cannot be ide ntifi ed w ith ave rs ion 
behaviour; "she is in pain" cannot mea n the same as "she IS manifesting 
aversion behd viour", because pain causes aversion behaviour. The seco nd 
objection depend s on two thought experiments . Kim (1996: 37) proposes to 
cons ider a race o f "S uper Spartans" who do feel pain, but behave as though 
they do not. It will some times be true of a "S uper Spartan " that "she is in 
pain", but fal se of her that "she is manifesting avers ion behavio ur". Therefore, 
these two statements do not have the same meaning. Now consider a group of 
perfect actors. They do not feel pain , bu t act as if they do. So, it wo uld 
sometimes be true of a perfect actor thdt "she is manifesting ave rsIon 
behav iour", but fa lse of her th at "she IS in pain" . Therefore, these two 
statemen ts do nol have the same meaning. 
If behav iourism were true it would so lve the mind-body problem . For 
if statement s abo ut the mental have the same meaning as statements about 
behaviour (mental = behaviour), then (presumably) mental phenomena wou ld 
jus t be behav ioural phe nomena . Highlig hting once aga in , being in pain wo uld 
just be manifesting ave rsion behaviour. B ut the relation between behav io ur 
and the body is straightforward. So if behaviourism were true, the relation 
between mental p henomena and the body would be unproblematic . 
1.2 Literature Rel'iew 
The purpose of literature review is to review and eva luate published literature 
on philosophical behaviourism. It identifies the philosophical underpinni ngs 
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embedded in the literature and highlight what is known and shows how the results of 
research by previous scholars are related to the study. 
In the mid-twentieth century, the "ordinary language" movement sparkled most 
brightly in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein, which are strongly related to 
philosophical behaviourism. Their investigations are "meant to throw light on the 
facts of our language" in its everyday employment (Hauser, 2002). One who 
misinterpret talk of people "as knowing, believing, or guessing something, as hoping, 
dreading, intending or shirking something, as designing this or being amused at that" 
(Ryle, 1999: 319) on the model of scientific hypotheses about inner mechanisms 
misinterprets the "logical grammar" (Hauser, 2002) of such talk, or makes a 
"category-mistake" (Ryle, 1999: 319). Such misconstrual is a philosophical perplexity 
on knowledge of other minds and mind-body interaction: for instance, attempts to 
solve the mind-body problem "presuppose the legitimacy of the disjunction, 'either 
there exist minds or there exist bodies (but not both)' which would be like saying, 
'eithcr she bought a left-hand and a right-hand glove or she boughl a pair of gloves 
(but not both)' " (Ryle, 1999: 323). 
Probably, the most basic misconstrual in philosophy which Witlgenstein and 
Ryle seem to agree in their diagnoses, engrosses in thinking on the way human thinks; 
when we talk of "knowing, believing, or guessing, that these verbs are supposed to 
denote the occurrence of specific either 'mechanical' (in brains) or 'paramechanical' 
(in streams of consciousness): as a result we have to deny the yet uncomprehended 
proccss in the yet unexplored medium" (Hauser, 2002: 7). And now, it looks as if we 
have denied the mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them. 
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In anot her case, Chemero (n.d.: 1) positioned Ryle as a philosopher who had 
contributed sign ificant relevance towards the current philosophical issues, especia lly 
in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. Ryle's work, The Concept ofMind is 
beneficiall y applied and ana lysed in the field of cognitive science for the last decade, 
models of cognitio n which do not make use of sentence-like, internal representatio ns 
are becoming popular and much e mphasized. "Hig hl y successful resea rc h on 
connectionist netwo rks, s ituated robots, and dyna mica l systems models have made it 
seem less and less plausible that the mind is a storehouse of sentences" (Chemero, 
n.d. : 1). A question that emerges here the issue w hether the novel and upcoming view 
about the mind is helping us to understand thought despite the scientific methods 
previously executed has discovered the details in promoting that "thoughts are not 
inner sen tences" (Chemero, n.d.: 1-2). But then again, if our best science of the mind 
shows that there are no inner sentences, how do we unders tand thought? 
Chemero (n.d.: 2) added that RyJe's explanation of the mind from The Concept 
of Mind, is quite a huge work. Ryle provides a path in comprehending thought in 
which inner sentences do not exist. Despite the heavy attention Chemero has on the 
whole work of Rylc, he singles out three main components worthy to be discussed, 
conveyed by Ry le in The Concept of Mind, rediscovered (brough t back to life) recentl y 
by philosophers of mind a nd cognitive scie ntis ts: " the primacy of knowledge how 
(knowledge of knowing hOW), the intrins ic connection between thought and action , 
and an ti-representatio nalism, the idea that thinking is not the processing of 
representat ions" (Cheme ro, n.d .: 2). These three issues were among the mo re 
important ones discussed in the philosophy of mind or cognitive science. Surprisingly, 
Ryle according to Chemero, "had set these positions out convincingly and in great 
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detail, long before anyone had built a mobile robot" (n.d.: 2), even though Ryle is 
scarcely mentioned in many of these debates. 
A good brief history of recent philosophy of mind and a survey of CUffent 
Issues is provided by one of the leading philosophers in this area, Daniel Dennett. 
Chemero stated that Dennett points out in the writing of The Concept of Mind there 
exist current trends in which resounded some of Rylean themes: "embodied and 
'situated' cognition: your mind is nol in your brain; skill is not represented; 
intelligence without representation" (n.d.: 4) - to name only the most obvious. 
Dennett, who is the mentee of Gilbert Ryle himself, also suggests something that is 
quite unexpected, stating that "The Concept of Mind is not, after all, a deep book. 
Instead, it is wonderfully, importantly shallow" (Dennett, 1999: 1). However, 
Chemero mentioned a part where Dennett (n.d.: 4) added that this shallowness has 
somehow made its way in conveying the most important thing about Ryle's 
philosophical approach. He indicates repeatedly lhat complex and deep problems 
could be made simpler and might even be totally diminished. Other than lhat, Dennett 
also provides an explanation of Ryle's The Concept of Mind by outlining the rise and 
fall of the ordinary language analysis, "a fall which parallels a corresponding decline 
in the domination of psychology by behaviourism" (Cole, Fetzer & Rankin, 1990: 12). 
1.3 Problem Statement 
As the literature indicates, the theory of philosophical behaviourism has had its 
adherents and critiques. However, as we are all well aware, philosophical 
behaviourism has been discredited. Since its inception, it has been heavily attacked 
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and criticised. Thus, the thesis would set out to review the arguments for and against 
philosophical behaviourism especially the criticisms that lead to the downfall of the 
theory. 
1.4 Qbjedin of the Research 
Specifically, the aim of this study is to examine critically the central thesis of 
philosophical or analytical behaviourism. Hence, the work would begin with a general 
exposition of the theory. Subsequently, the thesis would focus on the following 
research objectives: 
I. 	 What is behaviourism1 What makes it important and why is it widely 
discussed1 
u. 	 What is philosophical behaviourism1 Who are the precursors1 
Ill. 	Explore questions discussed by philosophers where arguments for (which may 
not be abundantly available as behaviourism has been refuted) and arguments 
against philosophical behaviourism are discussed. 
Finally, upon reviewing the arguments from both sides of philosophical 
behaviourism, I would then sum up the work with a conclusion and wherever possible 
I would contribute to the literature with some of my own criticisms. 
1.5 Research Scope and Limitations 
The scope of the research is limited to reviewing, contrasting and analysing the 
theories and arguments forwarded by philosophers in the discussion of philosophical 
or analytical behaviourism. This research is limited by the constraints of time and 
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limited sources of books. The prime so urce of references is ohlai ned mainly through 
books, ar ti c les, and journals from UNIM AS eNS (Uni ve rs iti Malaysia of Saraw ak, 
Centre of Academic and Information Service) and the World Wide Web of th e 
Interne t. 
1.6 Chapters Organ ization 
T he firs t chapter as introductory chapter wo uld explo re in great leng th what 
philosophical or anal ytical behaviourism is all about. F urthermore, thi s cha pter would 
bring to the examinati on o f rela ted works from the pas t related to the topic I am 
worki ng on and leads even tuall y to the obj ectives an d scopes of research. Then the 
second chapte r wou ld di scuss the defe nding philosophers' vi ews toward iss ues arising 
from philosophical behaviouri s m. The third chapter would look at cr itiques leve ll ed 
aga inst the tbeory. Finally, in the conclusion chapter, [ would try to sum up the issues 
discussed and a t the same time discuss some opin ions of my own. 
1.7 Conclusion 
Despite the fact that behav iourism is adopted diffe rentl y in various fields in 
philosophy and psychology, philosophical behaviou rism has ga ined influence and 
criticisms through decades of the evo lution o f behav iourism. In psychology , 
behaviourism is a twe ntieth-century mo veme nt wh iCh maintains tha t be haviour is the 
mind and is a creditable way to study mental phenomena scientifically. It opposes the 
introspective methods fur tb e s tucl y of mind emphasized in much psychology of the 
15 

